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Reviewed by Renée Lettow Lerner 
Amalia Kessler highlights fundamental problems with the adversarial 
system as it operates in the United States, problems which are crushing parties. 
Lawyers and judges—and even legal academics—are reluctant to acknowledge 
the depth of the problem. From time to time legal academics, commissions, and 
rules committees suggest tweaking this or that procedure. But the difficulty is 
far beyond fixing by tweaks.
Here’s an example: Why are depositions so long, so costly, and so pointless? 
Partisan lawyer control of depositions has ruined them as an efficient tool of 
fact investigation. Without strong judicial control, the deposition degenerates 
into partisan procedural bickering. American legal professionals are now so 
inured to this inefficiency and expense that they hardly notice. Lawyers paid 
by the hour have a financial incentive not to notice. A presiding judge on the 
continent of Europe examining a witness can cut straight to the heart of the 
matter in a few minutes. It would be salutary for every American lawyer, judge, 
legal academic, and civil party to see this judicial examination, to remind us of 
what we’re giving up with our obsession with adversarialism.
Another example: The American legal system almost never fully adjudicates 
cases on the merits. Trials are vanishing. In federal courts, less than two 
percent of civil cases are decided following a trial, and in state courts less 
than four percent.1 Less than five percent of criminal cases are decided after a 
1. Marc Galanter & Angela Frozena, The Continuing Decline of Civil Trials in American Courts, 
Pound Civil JustiCe institute 3 (2011), http://poundinstitute.org/sites/default/files/
docs/2011%20judges%20forum/2011%20Forum%20Galanter-Frozena%20Paper.pdf. (In 
2010 in civil cases in U.S. district courts, bench trials as a percentage of total dispositions 
were 0.34%, and jury trials were 0.73%.); Paula Hannaford-Agor, Scott Graves, & Shelley 
Spacek Miller, The Landscape of Civil Litigation in State Courts, Civil JustiCe initiative 25 (2015) 
(Of non-domestic civil cases reaching disposition in a sample of state courts between July 1, 
2012 and June 30, 2013, bench trials were 3.4% of dispositions, and jury trials were 0.1%. 16% 
of the sample were small claims.); John H. Langbein, The Disappearance of Civil Trial in the United 
States, 122 Yale l.J. 522, 524 (2012).
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trial.2 Instead, we have in civil cases some dismissals or summary judgments, 
but primarily settlement. In criminal cases, we have plea bargaining. What’s 
wrong with settlement and plea bargaining? Settlement negotiations turn 
in part on the merits of the case. But often, more importantly, results of 
negotiations depend on the parties’ tolerance of risk and delay, and the huge 
expected costs of litigation.3 Even in this era of settlement, the administrative 
costs of the tort system are high. For the decade 2000-2010, the total cost of the 
tort system averaged $241.4 billion per year, of which 24.3% was administrative 
expense—including legal expenses—for an average of $58.7 billion per year.4 
Plea bargaining is inherently coercive. The government, with its monopoly 
of charging power, can offer a defendant such a discount on a sentence in 
exchange for a guilty plea that it’s hard to refuse, no matter what the facts. 
Again, what’s driving prosecutors to offer such deals is the huge cost of 
litigation.5
And often ignored are the millions of pro se parties flooding lower courts. 
These parties don’t want to or can’t hire lawyers, because of the expense. 
Pro se parties’ suits concern matters such as debt, landlord-tenant disputes, 
immigration, domestic violence, divorce, and child custody. Without legal 
guidance, these parties flounder. They don’t know how to present key 
evidence, or even what evidence is relevant.6 Many judges and clerks provide 
little assistance, either because guiding parties takes too much time and 
effort, or because court personnel are afraid to contravene adversarial norms.7 
2.  For fiscal year 2016 in the U.S. district courts, of 77,318 total criminal defendants whose cases 
reached disposition, 226 received a disposition by bench trial, or 0.3%, and 1,627 received a 
disposition by jury trial, or 2.1%. 68,459, or 88.5%, pled guilty. Charges were dismissed for 
7,006 defendants, or 9%.  Statistics and Reports, Table 5.4, united states Courts, http://www.
uscourts.gov/statistics/table/54/judicial-facts-and-figures/2016/09/30. In a study of state 
felony defendants in the 75 largest counties in the United States in 2009, 2% were convicted 
in a trial, and 1% were acquitted. State Court Processing Statistics, Felony Defendants in Large Urban 
Counties, 2009—Statistical Tables, 24, Table 21, Bureau of JustiCe statistiCs (2013), https://www.
bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fdluc09.pdf.
3. J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil Settlement, 91 N.Y.u. l. rev. 59, 
68-80 (2016); Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and Regulation 
of Settlements, 46 Stan. l. rev. 1339, 1350-51 (1994); Hannaford-Agor, Graves, & Miller, supra 
note 1, at iv (“Litigation costs that routinely exceed the case value explain the low rate of 
dispositions involving any form of formal adjudication.”).
4. 2011 uPdate on u.s. tort Cost trends, towers watson, 6, 8, 12 (2012), http://www.
casact.org/library/studynotes/Towers-Watson-Tort-Cost-Trends.pdf. 
5. John H. Langbein, Torture and Plea Bargaining, 46 u. Chi. l. rev. 3, 8-11 (1978); Stephanos 
Bibas, Plea Bargaining Outside the Shadow of Trial, 117 harv. l. rev. 2464, 2470-86 (2004).
6. Jessica K. Steinberg, Demand Side Reform in the Poor People’s Court, 47 Conn. l. rev. 741, 743-44, 
754-60 (2015).
7. BenJamin h. Barton & stePhanos BiBas, reBooting JustiCe: more teChnologY, fewer 
lawYers, and the future of law 49-53 (2017).
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Other judges help pro se litigants in a way that’s completely discretionary and 
inconsistent.8
It’s no wonder that in the World Justice Project’s most recent Rule of Law 
Index, the United States’ civil justice system received an abysmal score for 
“accessibility and affordability.”9
Our system of adjudication, in short, is a failure. How did it get this way? 
Why is the American legal profession so complacent? Why are legal academics 
so silent? And what can be done?
Kessler’s book answers these questions. She puts the blame where it belongs, 
on Americans’ unthinking adoration of adversarialism. American lawyers 
have worked hard to foster this blind reverence. A few persons have dared 
to challenge it.10 Kessler has the historical and comparative knowledge to do 
so effectively. Her book demonstrates, from the early nineteenth century, the 
harmful effects of lawyer championing of adversarial procedure. And Kessler 
shows that there are practical alternatives. These alternatives are found not 
just in other legal systems, but in our own history.
The main difference between adversarial and inquisitorial proceedings 
is who controls presentation of evidence: the parties, meaning the lawyers, 
or judges. On the continent of Europe in civil cases, the parties nominate—
suggest to the judge—evidence such as witnesses and documents. The judge 
questions parties and lawyers, reviews documents, calls witnesses, and 
examines them personally. In modern practice, counsel for the parties are 
present at examinations of witnesses, but they are not the primary questioners. 
Proceedings are discontinuous, going forward in discrete, logical stages. In 
contrast, a lay jury requires proceedings that are continuous, with all evidence 
heard at once in a concentrated trial. On the continent, if a defendant is found 
8. Jessica K. Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown and Judicial Role Confusion in “Small Case” Civil Justice, 
2016 BYu l. rev. 899, 938-47.
9. 0.42 out of a possible 1.0. The United States’ overall score was 0.73. It was ranked 19th out 
of the 113 countries. world JustiCe ProJeCt, rule of law index 2017-2018, at 148, https://
worldjusticeproject.org/sites/default/files/documents/WJP_ROLI_2017-18_Online-
Edition_0.pdf. 
10. Roscoe Pound, The Causes of Popular Dissatisfaction with the Administration of Justice, 29 ann. reP. 
a.B.a. 395, 404-05 (1906) (arguing that “contentious procedure” “disfigures our judicial 
administration at every point”); Jerome frank, Courts on trial: mYth and realitY in 
ameriCan JustiCe 80-102 (1949); Marvin E. Frankel, The Search for Truth: An Umpireal View, 
123 u. Pa. l. rev. 1031 (1975); gordon tulloCk, trials on trial: the Pure theorY of 
legal ProCedure 87-99 (1980); John H. Langbein, The German Advantage in Civil Procedure, 52 
u. Chi. l. rev. 823 (1985); Gordon Van Kessel, Adversary Excesses in the American Criminal Trial, 
67 notre dame l. rev. 403 (1992); william t. Pizzi, trials without truth: whY our 
sYstem of Criminal trials has BeCome an exPensive failure and what we need to 
do to reBuild it (1999); roBert a. kagan, adversarial legalism: the ameriCan waY 
of law (2001); theodore l. kuBiCek, adversarial JustiCe: ameriCa’s Court sYstem 
on trial (2006); David Alan Sklansky, Anti-Inquisitorialism, 122 harv. l. rev. 1634 (2009); 
BenJamin h. Barton, the lawYer-Judge Bias in the ameriCan legal sYstem (2011); 
James r. maxeiner, failures of ameriCan Civil JustiCe in international PersPeCtive 
(2011); Steinberg, Adversary Breakdown, supra note 8; Barton & BiBas, supra note 7, at 150-54.
891
not liable, there is no need to hear evidence about damages. Appeals are 
thorough, on questions of fact as well as law, and on the merits (3).11
Lawyers and judges tend to identify the American legal tradition exclusively 
with common-law, adversarial procedure.12 Many American legal professionals 
are not aware that our entire system of pretrial discovery—depositions, 
interrogatories, document discovery, and the rest—is drawn from equity, a 
nonadversarial tradition.13 This ignorance is understandable, because lawyers 
took control of these practices and transformed them to their liking. In this 
book, Kessler shows that the assumption of an exclusively adversarial tradition 
in America is mistaken. She reveals the rich vein of American procedure that 
is nonadversarial, or, as she puts it, quasi-inquisitorial. Courts that eschewed 
adversarial proceedings included courts of equity, conciliation courts, and 
Freedmen’s Bureau courts.
Lawyers Transform Equity from Inquisitorial to Adversarial
Kessler’s story of the fate of New York’s court of equity is especially 
fascinating, and instructive. Few members of the legal profession today 
understand the significance of equity in the Anglo-American legal tradition. 
In part, that’s because of the way we teach civil procedure. We often discuss 
jury trial—or at least its former importance—without spending much time 
explaining that it was necessary for the legal system as a whole, from its earliest 
days, to have an alternative. We rarely explain to students the differences 
between the systems of “common law” (or “law”) and equity—and the reasons 
for these differences.
The mere term “common law” often confuses law students and lawyers. 
They tend to associate the term with law as declared in judicial decisions as 
opposed to statutes. Sometimes they use it to refer to the Anglo-American 
system as a whole, as opposed to the civil law tradition that developed on 
the continent of Europe. They don’t understand that “common law” refers 
to a system developed in a particular set of English courts with particular 
jurisdiction and procedure. The common-law courts were characterized by 
strict limits on joinder of parties and claims; pleading down to one or few 
factual issues; oral and public trial; the inability of parties or other interested 
11. See also arthur engelmann et al., a historY of Continental Civil ProCedure 3-81 
(Robert Wyness Millar trans. & ed., 1969) (1927); Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 
10, at 826-35; Hein Kötz, Civil Justice Systems in Europe and the United States, 13 Duke J. ComP. & 
int’l l. 61, 63-76 (2003); Peter l. murraY & rolf stürner, german Civil JustiCe 254-
59 (2004); James r. maxeiner, guiding litigation: aPPlYing law to faCts in germanY 
9-15 (2008), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1230453.
12. See, e.g., Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 84 (1988) (“The paramount importance of vigorous 
representation follows from the nature of our adversarial system of justice. This system is 
premised on the well-tested principle that truth—as well as fairness—is ‘best discovered by 
powerful statements on both sides of the question.’”) (citation omitted); Sklansky, supra note 
10, at 1635-39.
13. Stephen N. Subrin, How Equity Conquered Common Law: The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure in 
Historical Perspective, 135 u. Penn. l. rev. 909, 922-25 (1987).
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persons to testify; narrow remedies; lack of appeal on the merits; and—driving 
the rest—decision-making by lay juries.14
As is evident, common-law procedure could not adequately handle 
disputes that were factually complex, involved multiple parties and claims, or 
required complicated remedies such as injunctions. Because of the limitations 
of common-law procedure, it was vital to have an alternative. The main 
alternative was equity, as administered in the Court of Chancery. In equity, a 
judge decided the case, not a jury. Judicial officers were active in gathering and 
evaluating documents and testimony. Chancery drew inspiration for much of 
its practice from the inquisitorial systems on the continent of Europe.15
England passed the system of equity to the American colonies, hence to 
the states. One of the many strengths of the book is Kessler’s illumination 
of English practice, and the ways in which American practice drew from it 
or departed from it. The transatlantic dialogue about procedure during this 
period was powerful, with the Americans and English borrowing ideas from 
each other.
Kessler lays out the English Chancery practice of examining witnesses: in 
private, without parties’ counsel present, by a court official or court-appointed 
commissioners, “gravely, temperately, and leisurely,” “without any menace, 
disturbance, or interruption,” with testimony recorded in writing, and with a 
general prohibition on examining witnesses repeatedly (32-33). The New York 
court of equity borrowed these features, which were intended to prevent the 
parties from securing perjured, or unreliable, testimony. A salient characteristic 
of the adversarial system is the bias effect. Because of party gathering and 
presentation of proofs, witnesses and other evidence tend to be strongly biased, 
obfuscating the truth. Equity procedure aimed to reduce the bias effect.
In the new republic, American judges such as James Kent and Joseph Story 
extolled the role of the equity judge. Such a judge, they explained, needed not 
only legal learning but a highly developed morality. Equity played a special role 
in protecting the weak, including minors, women, and the mentally ill. Because 
equity judges were far more active in shaping litigation and investigating facts 
than common-law judges, they had the potential to mitigate another of the 
adversarial system’s worst defects: the wealth effect. Adversarial procedure 
gives powerful advantages to the wealthy, who can afford the most persuasive 
lawyers and partisan experts.
In other words, an inquisitorial system treats investigation and adjudication 
of claims as a public good. The parties do not bear the costs themselves. So 
inquisitorial systems are—or at least have the potential to be—more accessible 
to and protective of the poor.
14. John h. langBein, renée lettow lerner, & BruCe P. smith, historY of the Common 
law: the develoPment of anglo-ameriCan legal institutions 86-105, 147-52, 271-74, 
702-05 (2009).
15. Id. at 268-80.
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But equity courts in England and in New York suffered from a fatal mistake. 
These courts did not have enough judicial staff. Running an inquisitorial 
system requires more judges or court staff than does a common-law system, 
because judicial personnel actively investigate a case and examine witnesses. 
In England until the nineteenth century, a single man, the Lord Chancellor, 
ran the entire system of equity with little assistance. Likewise, in the early 
nineteenth century, New York had only one chancellor. Not surprisingly, 
therefore, both the English and New York courts of equity began to be plagued 
with delay.
These delays grew worse, and eventually intolerable, because of equity 
courts’ rising caseload. Equity courts were vital to support the growing 
commercial economy of England and New York. Courts of equity handled, 
among other issues, matters concerning mortgages and business associations. 
As Kessler shows, in New York the court of chancery was centrally involved in 
collection of debt.
Kessler provides deep economic, political, and social context for the 
procedural changes she describes. In the chapters on chancery, for example, she 
discusses the transformation of a subsistence economy into a market economy. 
She is attentive to both the internal conditions of the legal system—such as the 
understaffing of chancery—and external influences—such as anxieties about 
the change to a market economy, the effects of the financial panics of 1837 and 
1839, and the rise of mass democracy.
Lawyers took advantage of both the understaffing of chancery and the 
growing view that democracy required more public institutions to insert 
themselves into examinations of chancery witnesses. Well before the Field 
Code formally merged law and equity in New York in 1848, the parties’ lawyers 
not only were routinely present at examination of chancery witnesses, but did 
all or virtually all the questioning themselves.16 Cross-examination of a single 
witness could last days. The result was that chancery became less inquisitorial 
and more adversarial. As Kessler observes, “One of the most important 
consequences of the new dominance of lawyers in chancery proceedings was a 
significant increase in cost and delay” (102).
To uncover these changes, Kessler has done extensive archival research. 
She has unearthed telling contrasts between the written record of witness 
examinations before the lawyers got involved, and after. In the era before the 
parties’ lawyers inserted themselves, records of witness examinations were 
brief summaries of the witness’s testimony and the conclusions the taker of 
testimony drew from it. After the lawyers showed up, the written record grew 
much longer and began to read more like a verbatim transcript, with extensive 
wrangling between the lawyers over the propriety of questions and answers.
The resemblance to a modern deposition is not accidental.
16. On the subsequent history of the Field Code’s merger of law and equity, see Kellen Funk, 
Equity without Chancery: The Fusion of Law and Equity in the Field Code of Civil Procedure, New York 1846-
76, 36 J. legal hist. 152 (2015).
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The Importance of Lawyers’ Interests
Why were lawyers so eager to insert themselves into witness examination? 
There were a variety of reasons, some immediate and others broader. On 
the immediate side, Kessler acknowledges that lawyers, by dominating 
proceedings, wanted to gain strategic advantage in litigation.
It would have been worth, too, discussing the importance of lawyers’ fees. 
The more lawyers’ skill is perceived as shaping the outcome of litigation, the 
more money they can charge clients. Therefore, adversarial systems favor 
higher lawyer incomes.17
To enjoy the higher incomes that adversarial procedure could bring, lawyers 
had to release themselves from regulation of their fees. During this period, 
American lawyers pushed hard to get free from any vestiges of restrictions 
imposed by courts or legislatures.18 When it came to fees, American lawyers 
presented themselves as businessmen who should enjoy freedom of contract 
just like other businessmen—including the use of contingent fees. In contrast 
to the regulated English bar, which was prohibited from charging contingent 
fees, American lawyers gained total freedom to contract for fees. As a result, 
the American bar was more entrepreneurial and aggressive. American lawyers’ 
freedom respecting fees was one reason the United States never adopted the 
rule common to the rest of the world: The loser in litigation pays the winner’s 
legal expenses, including lawyer fees.
Kessler reveals the broader political and social context in which lawyers 
operated. She especially highlights lawyers’ efforts, until now understudied, 
to display the virtues of civic republicanism. Antebellum lawyers faced serious 
challenges from mass democracy. Hostility toward the legal profession was 
strong, because of concern that lawyers fomented disputes and were too 
expensive.
In response, American lawyers—not for the last time19—wrapped themselves 
in virtue, justice, democracy, and liberty. In portraits, lawyers wrapped 
themselves in a toga, the symbol of ancient civic republican virtue. The book 
includes, along with other vivid images, an arresting 1809-1810 portrait of 
Virginia lawyer William Wirt in a toga (155).
American lawyers claimed that they were virtuous truth-seekers exposing 
the vice that could undermine not only commercial relations and justice, 
but democracy and liberty. Lawyers demonized judge-empowering courts of 
equity, and valorized their own oratory. Echoing seventeenth-century English 
17. tulloCk, supra note 10, at 96-97.
18. John Leubsdorf, Toward a History of the American Rule on Attorney Fee Recovery, 47 law & ContemP. 
ProBs. 9, 10-17 (1984); Peter Karsten, Enabling the Poor to Have Their Day in Court: The Sanctioning 
of Contingency Fee Contracts, A History to 1940, 47 dePaul l. rev. 231, 234-45 (1998); langBein, 
lerner, & smith, supra note 14, at 1048-56.
19. On the trial bar’s linking of adversarial procedure with liberty and anti-Communism after 
World War II, see John faBian witt, Patriots and CosmoPolitans: hidden stories of 
ameriCan law 240-78 (2007); kagan, supra note 10, at 34-58.
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rhetoric, American lawyers linked courts of equity with absolutist rule, and 
the common law with liberty. They eagerly imported common-law practices 
into equity. Lawyers emphasized their love of virtue in arguments to the jury 
and cross-examination. Lawyers glossed over the possibility that both of 
these could be misleading or promote obfuscation. Kessler has found choice 
examples in the unpublished diary of a small-town New York lawyer, Henry 
Vanderlyn. Vanderlyn especially prided himself on his cross-examination of an 
adverse witness in a chancery case, in which he gloated that he had revealed 
the wicked fraud of the “infamous villain” (186). This single cross-examination 
took six days.
Lawyers’ claims of civic virtue enhanced not only their standing in their 
communities, but also their chances of election to public office. Many lawyers 
of that era had political ambitions. Kessler discusses lawyers’ dominance of 
legislatures of the period, both state and federal. By the 1840s and 1850s, for 
example, 67% of the members of the U.S. House of Representatives were 
lawyers (152).20 Lawyers especially predominated on legislative committees 
concerning legal procedure, and therefore were well-positioned to propose 
and enact legislation favoring the profession. Such legislation included 
requirements that chancery testimony be taken orally and in public—that is, 
adversarial examination and cross-examination by lawyers (96-97). The fox 
was guarding the henhouse.
Kessler does a great service in uncovering the self-interested motives of 
lawyers. She mentions the weakness of the American bench, in contrast to the 
powerful English bench (166, 330-31). It would be good to hear more about 
the American bench’s weakness. The turn to greater adversarialism required 
participation by not just lawyers, but also judges. Lawyers became more 
aggressive, but judges had to let them take control.
Kessler points out that in New York chancery, rising caseloads with not 
enough addition of judges was partly responsible for handing over authority to 
examine witnesses to lawyers. Chancellor James Kent authorized examination 
of witnesses by counsel, in an effort to curb delay. He soon regretted it. The 
law of unintended consequences operated with a vengeance; delays grew worse 
than ever, along with costs. Kent might have predicted that giving lawyers a 
greater adversarial role would never result in more efficiency.
Another important development that weakened the bench during this 
period was the advent of judicial elections.21 Judicial elections led to corruption 
of the bench by party machines in some areas, and also greater dependence 
of judges on the bar for nomination and election. The trial bench, especially, 
diminished in power and prestige. Judges in many states lost the power to 
20. Citing mark C. miller, the high Priests of ameriCan PolitiCs: the role of lawYers 
in ameriCan PolitiCal institutions 58 (1995).
21. Jed handelsman shugerman, the PeoPle’s Courts: Pursuing JudiCial indePendenCe in 
ameriCa 103-122 (2012); Renée Lettow Lerner, From Popular Control to Independence: Reform of the 
Elected Judiciary in Boss Tweed’s New York, 15 geo. mason l. rev. 109, 114-30 (2007); langBein, 
lerner, & smith, supra note 14, at 503-13.
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comment on evidence to the jury.22 Judicial comment on evidence was one of 
the principal means that English judges used to prevent counsel from having 
too much emotional sway over the jury. Judicial comment was so powerful in 
England in civil cases—and English judges were so generally respected—that 
in the mid-nineteenth century many English legal professionals argued that 
jury trial was an unnecessary bother and expense. From the mid-nineteenth 
century on, England began curtailing use of civil jury trials; today they are 
virtually abolished.23 Bench trials occur instead. Because they sit without juries 
in civil cases, English judges are active on the bench, and don’t hesitate to ask 
questions of witnesses. English barristers presenting a case or arguing before 
judges are businesslike. They do not make the obvious emotional appeals that 
American lawyers make to lay juries.
Conciliation Courts and Freedmen’s Bureau Courts
Kessler examines two other alternatives to adversarial proceedings besides 
equity: conciliation courts and Freedmen’s Bureau courts. Conciliation courts 
originated in the revolutionary French bureaux de conciliation, established in 
1790, and spread to other European countries including Spain. Kessler is well-
positioned to explore this French influence, as she has studied and written 
extensively about French tribunals, especially merchant courts.24 Through 
Spanish influence, Florida and California established a variant of these courts, 
known as alcaldes courts. Several other state legislatures and constitutional 
conventions seriously considered adopting conciliation courts, and a few 
authorized them. These courts, however, either were never actually established 
or soon sputtered and died. The Freedmen’s Bureau courts were modeled on 
the conciliation courts. During military occupation of the South, Freedmen’s 
Bureau courts provided some measure of justice to newly freed African-
Americans. But they depended completely on military force, and ended with 
the withdrawal of Northern armies.
Both the conciliation courts and the Freedmen’s Bureau courts had the 
admirable goal of reducing the wealth effect. They were intended to provide 
ready access to justice for the poor, without the need to hire lawyers. Supporters 
of conciliation courts were particularly concerned to resolve disputes about 
debt (in Florida) and to quiet labor unrest (in New York). Evangelical 
Christians—who gave high priority to the peaceful reconciliation of differences 
and to justice for the poor and newly free—strongly promoted both courts.
22. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Transformation of the American Civil Trial: The Silent Judge, 42 wm. & 
marY l. rev. 195, 220-41 (2000); Kenneth A. Krasity, The Role of the Judge in Jury Trials: The 
Elimination of Judicial Evaluation of Fact in American State Courts from 1795 to 1913, 62 u. det. l. rev. 
595 (1985).
23. Conor Hanly, The Decline of Civil Jury Trial in Nineteenth-Century England, 26 J. legal hist. 253, 
255-78 (2005).
24. amalia d. kessler, a revolution in CommerCe: the Parisian merChant Court and 
the rise of CommerCial soCietY in eighteenth-CenturY franCe (2007).
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Neither of these courts was supposed to be staffed by legal professionals, 
and neither was supposed to apply formal law. The idea was that the judges 
would command respect because of their high position in the community, and 
they would encourage litigants to follow community norms. In the conciliation 
courts, this was really a sort of mediation. If the parties could not agree, they 
could proceed to an ordinary civil suit. Applying Max Weber’s categories, 
conciliation courts and Freedmen’s Bureau courts offered “kadi justice” as 
opposed to formal rationality and fixed legal rules. As Weber conceived it, the 
kadi, Islamic law judges, used their own authority and community norms to 
achieve personalized justice without regard to predictability (227).25 Indeed, 
the Spanish word alcalde derives from al-kadi.
This informal, personal conception of law ran into many difficulties 
in the American context. In the relatively egalitarian American society, it 
was unclear who, if anyone, had sufficient extralegal authority to persuade 
litigants to defer and agree. Community norms were also often disputed. 
This problem was especially acute in the Freedmen’s Bureau courts. A gulf 
divided the expectations of the Southern white planters, on the one hand, 
and on the other of African-American workers and the Northern army officers 
who served as judges, who espoused free labor beliefs. Predictably, Southern 
whites and Northern Democrats attacked the Freedmen’s Bureau courts as an 
“oppression,” and a “Star Chamber inquisition[],” “without any fixed rules of 
law (312-314).” This opposition praised adversarial procedure. But regardless 
of whether the system was adversarial or inquisitorial, in the American context, 
it was highly desirable for judges to have legal training, and to derive their 
authority from the formal, predictable law they applied. The Freedmen’s 
Bureau courts were a solution that could only be temporary.
Solutions
What about a more permanent solution to the woes of our adversarial 
system? Kessler is under no illusions about the difficulties. Her entire book 
illustrates the opposition one can expect from the lawyers. I would add, many 
judges are not inclined to help. In our system, judges are themselves members 
of the bar and former lawyers, and so can be expected to share a bias toward 
the profession.26 In contrast, judges on the continent of Europe have separate 
legal training specifically as judges, and few of them have been practicing 
lawyers first. The role of advocate and the role of truth-finder are considered 
to be different.27 And deciding—let alone investigating—cases on the merits is 
25. Citing 2 max weBer, eConomY and soCietY: an outline of interPretive soCiologY 976 
(Guenther Roth & Claus Wittich eds., 1978).
26. Barton, lawYer-Judge Bias, supra note 10, at 1-3, 21-38. Gillian Hadfield has observed that, 
in comparison with other countries, the American bar and bench combined wield enormous 
power over the legal system and its costs. Gillian K. Hadfield, Higher Demand, Lower Supply? A 
Comparative Assessment of the Legal Resource Landscape for Ordinary Americans, 37 fordham urB. l.J. 
152 (2010).
27. Renée Lettow Lerner, The Intersection of Two Systems: An American on Trial for an American Murder in the 
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hard work and entails responsibility. Few judges are eager for more work and 
more responsibility.
Even the legal academy has been infected with proadversarial bias. The 
required first-year, first-semester civil procedure course “focuses almost 
exclusively on adversarial courtroom litigation,” (336) as opposed to alternative 
dispute resolution proceedings, settlement negotiations, and administrative 
hearings. Some academics glorify the idea of the adversarial litigator as “a 
warrior on behalf of the public good” (337). To make public policy through 
litigation—rather than legislation or regulation—is held out as the highest 
professional ideal. Other academics see a spiritual connection between the 
adversarial system and a free-market economy. The animating principle 
of both, according to Richard Posner (considered here as an academic), is 
competition (337).28 But there is a vast difference between voluntary exchanges 
for goods and services, and a government-run system of dispute resolution that 
ultimately relies on force. In litigation, adversarialism leads to the wealth effect 
and the bias effect, with greater cost, delay, and often inaccuracy. Adversarial 
competition increases efficiency in a market, but decreases efficiency in 
litigation.
Yet we need not despair. There are plausible ways to move the system closer 
to the inquisitorial model, and thus lift the burden the lawyers impose and 
reduce the wealth and bias effects.
A promising reform Kessler suggests for state and federal courts is to 
expand the role of the master and to make masters permanent, salaried judicial 
staff (349). This would relieve the parties of their current burden of paying the 
master. Kessler emphasizes the importance of finding mechanisms to ensure 
the masters’ competence and neutrality. Masters could be tasked with taking 
greater control of pretrial discovery, preventing some of the abuse and keeping 
the case focused on the merits.
These changes to masters would partially solve the perennial problem 
of a shortage of judges. Kessler’s solution seems more likely to come about 
than an increase in the number of ordinary judges. Calling for an increase 
in ordinary judges tends to trigger protests from sitting judges because their 
prestige would be diluted. Proposing a significant increase in ordinary judges 
would also provoke partisan battles over appointment and allocation. These 
difficulties help to explain the creation in 1968, and growth over the past 
fifty years in the number and role, of federal magistrate judges.29 Magistrate 
judges, who are not Article III judges and are appointed for a term, have lower 
prestige than district judges, and so do not threaten district judges’ dignity or 
French Cour d’Assises, 2001 u. ill. l. rev. 791, 809-12.
28. Citing riChard a. Posner, eConomiC analYsis of law 321 (1972).
29. russell r. wheeler & CYnthia harrison, Creating the federal JudiCial sYstem 24 (3d 
ed. 2005), https://www.fjc.gov/sites/default/files/2012/Creat3ed.pdf; Peter G. McCabe, A 
Brief History of the Federal Magistrate Judges Program, fed. law., May/June 2014, at 44, 46-47, 50-
52; Peter G. McCabe, The Federal Magistrate Act of 1979, 16 harv. J. on legis. 343 (1979).
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provoke such political battles. The federal judiciary has, in effect, increased 
its numbers and stratification. Greater numbers and stratification of judges, 
with corresponding possibilities for promotion based on performance, are 
important ways nonadversarial systems ensure an adequate and competent 
judiciary.
Kessler also makes a valuable suggestion concerning expert witnesses. 
Expert testimony in civil cases is today one of the worst features of the 
American adversarial system. Trials and hearings degenerate into laughable 
battles between dueling “experts,” utterly scripted by the lawyers. Judges are 
tasked with keeping junk science out of the courtroom, but Daubert hearings 
have themselves become lengthy partisan spectacles. Kessler proposes that 
instead of this apotheosis of adversarial cost, delay, and bias, American judges 
appoint their own experts. How would a judge choose an expert? Kessler 
recommends the French solution, which is also the German solution. French 
and German courts maintain rosters of pre-vetted experts on particular topics 
in particular geographic areas.30 Kessler also envisions the possibility of using 
groups of experts to advise the judge as a sort of special jury.
These reforms point to the ultimate goal of empowering the judge. And we 
should have judges worthy of empowerment. To the extent that we hesitate to 
give judges more power over litigation because of their bias or incompetence, 
there are ways to check those problems. Two possibilities are the use of a 
panel of judges, including in the first instance, and a thorough appeal on 
the merits, of fact as well as law. Judges should feel personal responsibility 
for the substantive correctness of the outcome, and not just sit as umpires or 
referees enforcing procedural rules. It’s a measure of how far adversarialism 
has triumphed that this is a radical proposition in the United States today.
Lawyers and judges are not going to make this argument. One of the great 
advantages we have as academics standing outside the fray is our ability to 
critique the legal profession and the legal system. Lawyers and judges have 
criticized the legal academy as impractical or useless.31 We have a response. 
Virtually the entire American legal system is designed for the benefit of lawyers 
at the expense of parties and society as a whole. Legal academics are almost 
the only group with the knowledge and freedom to reveal this, and to argue 
for much-needed reform.
30. Amalia D. Kessler, Our Inquisitorial Tradition: Equity Procedure, Due Process, and the Search for an 
Alternative to the Adversarial, 90 Cornell l. rev. 1181, 1265-71 (2005); Lerner, Intersection of Two 
Systems, supra note 27, at 836-38; Langbein, German Advantage, supra note 10, at 835-41.
31. Judge Harry Edwards’ 1992 critique of the legal academy drew great attention. Harry T. 
Edwards, The Growing Disjunction Between Legal Education and the Legal Profession, 91 MiCh. l. 
rev. 34 (1992). In 2011, Chief Justice John Roberts made a similar, if much more informal, 
critique. “Pick up a copy of any law review that you see, and the first article is likely to be the 
influence of Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th Century Bulgaria, which I’m 
sure was of great interest to the academic that wrote it, but isn’t as much help to the bar.” 
John G. Roberts, Jr., Remarks at the Fourth Circuit Judicial Conference, C-SPAN (June 25, 
2011), https://www.c-span.org/video/?300203-1/conversation-chief-justice-roberts.
Book Review: Inventing American Exceptionalism
